Yellow Dog Contract: Meaning, History & Examples

What is a Yellow Dog Contract?

Yellow Dog Contract is defined as a contract in which an employer and an employee agree that the employee will refrain from joining the company’s labour union. The term “yellow dog contract” is metaphorically used to describe the individual signing the agreement, implying that only a “yellow dog” would willingly sign away their constitutional rights for employment. By agreeing to this clause, the employee pledges not to work for a direct competitor in the future, which could potentially harm their current employer. The advantage of a yellow dog contract for the employer is that it provides legal recourse if the employees decide to revolt against the company.

History of Yellow Dog Contract

The history of the ‘yellow dog contract’ can be broken down into several key periods:

1. Inception in the 1870s: The ‘yellow dog contract’ began as a written pact, often referred to as an “Infamous” or “Iron-Clad” document, which included an anti-union commitment. By signing this document, an employee pledged not to join their trade union. Starting in 1887 with New York, sixteen states criminalized the act of an employer compelling their employees to promise not to join a union.

2. Late 19th Century and Early 20th Century: During this period, these anti-union proclamations lost their significance. Workers no longer felt obligated to honour them, and union organisers paid little attention to them. By the early 20th century, only the coal mining and metal industries continued to use yellow dog contracts. Moreover, it was not the employee’s union membership that was forbidden, but their involvement in activities that necessitated union membership.

3. 1910 Strike: In 1910, the International United Brotherhood of Leather Workers on Horse Goods organised a national strike. However, the strike was unsuccessful, with many employers demanding both written and verbal assurances from their employees that they would leave and remain out of unions as a condition of returning to work.

4. Spring of 1921: The term “yellow dog” first appeared in print in the spring of 1921 in publications aimed at labour union members. The editor of the United Mine Workers’ Journal echoed the sentiments of many when he remarked, “This agreement has been well named. It is yellow dog for sure. Signing such a document diminishes a man to the status of a submissive servant, devoid of power, surrendering all his constitutional and legal rights to his employer. It’s akin to reducing oneself to the stature of a lowly canine.

5. 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act: By 1932, the Norris-LaGuardia Act had prohibited yellow dog contracts in the private sector. However, they were still permitted in the public sector, including federal jobs, until the 1960s. This marked the end of the history of the yellow dog contract, as all such contracts from that point forward were deemed illegal and unenforceable.

Example of Yellow Dog Contract

A case that exemplifies a yellow dog contract was brought before the United States Supreme Court in 1915, a dozen years after Kansas enacted a law to promote employee unionisation. This law prohibited employers from imposing conditions on their jobs that required an employee to reject union membership or cease participation in one before working for their companies. However, Coppage, an employer, introduced a clause in his employment contracts 12 years later that compelled employees to renounce their right to join a labour union upon accepting employment.

This “no joining” clause in his contracts was a violation of the state law that banned all forms of anti-union contracts. This case is an instance of yellow dog contracts infringing the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically the Amendment’s Due Process clause.

The question then arose whether a state could prevent an employer from making employment with his company conditional on the candidate’s union membership status. Coppage was ultimately convicted of violating Kansas state law, and a fine was imposed on him, with imprisonment being an alternative punishment. Coppage sought a review of the decision from the Kansas State Supreme Court, where the original ruling was confirmed. Coppage then took the case to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court eventually overturned the lower courts’ decisions, ruling that both parties to a contract have the right to terminate the employment “at will,” and for any reason. The employee has the right to reject the employment opportunity if he values his union membership over the job being offered. The Court noted that a candidate’s decision to accept a job while abstaining from joining a union is not actually a violation of his freedoms. The employer and the employee have the liberty to decide the terms of their association if they choose to proceed with it at all.

The Court said,

When an individual agrees to forgo union membership during his tenure in a specific role, he is not relinquishing any portion of his constitutional liberties. He has the option to reject the job under those conditions, just as the employer has the right to refuse to offer employment under different terms. After all, It takes two to make a bargain. Even after accepting a job under these conditions, the individual retains the right to join the union once the employment period ends; or, if employed at will, he can do so at any time by simply resigning. If he agrees to refrain from joining during a specified employment period, his situation is no different from that typically associated with term contracts. Constitutional freedom of contract does not imply that a party is as free after entering into a contract as before; he cannot break it without consequences. Freedom of contract can only be enjoyed by exercising it, and each exercise involves making a commitment that, if fulfilled, prevents any inconsistent behavior for the time being.”

Furthermore,

The organisation possesses the authority to recruit individuals it finds suitable and to let go of those it deems unfit, without the obligation to provide an explanation. It is free to contract for services in any manner that is mutually satisfactory. No legislative restrictions can be imposed on the lawful exercise of these rights.”

This case serves as an example of a successful yellow dog contract, as the employer who drafted it was permitted to continue doing so and requiring employees to adhere to them. However, it’s worth noting that this case was adjudicated years before the Norris-LaGuardia Act was enacted.

Conclusion

The “yellow dog contract,” an agreement between an employer and an employee that prohibited the latter from joining a labour union, has a complex history dating back to the 1870s. These contracts were initially upheld by law, with the Supreme Court ruling in favor of employers’ rights to terminate employment “at will” and for any reason. However, the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932 marked a significant shift in labour rights, rendering yellow dog contracts illegal in the private sector and limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts in nonviolent labour disputes. Despite this, yellow dog contracts persisted in the public sector until the 1960s, when they were finally deemed unlawful and unenforceable. This journey reflects the evolving landscape of labor rights and the ongoing struggle for worker autonomy and freedom of association.